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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS A
LEARNING EXPERIENCE
Daniel A. Farber*
In 1969 our environmental problems seemed clear, and the biggest
question was whether we had the political will to adopt the obvious solu-
tions. The first round of environmental statutes, which set ambitious
goals and extremely short deadlines, reflected this assumpiton. Congress
assumed that regulators had the information necessary to solve environ-
mental problems, and needed only a stem mandate to spring into action.
As it has turned out, the political power of environmentalism has
not been in question. In contrast, the information required for regulation
has often proved unavailable, making references to scientific uncertainty
commonplace in the environmental literature. The expansion of scien-
tific knowledge has revealed new environmental problems, while some-
times raising questions about the seriousness of old ones. We have also
learned a great deal about regulatory mechanisms, as we have seen some
regulatory schemes work and other promising ideas fail.
Reviewing this history raises questions about the way we concep-
tualize environmental protection. For lawyers and policy analysts alike,
the most natural approach is problem solving: identify an issue, assemble
the available information, evaluate potential responses, and solve the
problem. Courts also fall naturally into this mode, seeking to evaluate
the cogency of agency decisions against a closed administrative record.
In a relatively static world, policy makers do well to deliberate fully, so
as to make each decision the best possible given current goals and avail-
able information.
In environmental law, however, every solution seems provisional
and subject to reevaluation as new information appears and old solutions
are tested against experience. Rather than viewing policy making as a
one-shot exercise, in which the goal is to adopt the optimum solution
based on current information, we might do better to think of a continu-
ous process of learning and experimentation. "What is the optimum de-
cision today?" may be less important than "What is the best strategy for
developing and responding to new information about the problem?" In
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other words, the key question may be how to engage in effective learning
in this regulatory setting.
I. WHERE ARE WE?
Because environmental law is so complex and technical, any effort at
overall assessment necessarily comes at the price of ruthless oversimplifi-
cation. Nevertheless, such an assessment is necessary if we are even go-
ing to begin to think about future directions for environmental law.
What follows is an abbreviated-and undoubtedly subjective-appraisal
of the lessons we have learned since 1969.
A. Environmental Protection as a Goal
It would have been quite reasonable in 1969 to wonder whether en-
vironmentalism was a passing fad. As events unfolded, however, en-
vironmentalist attitudes quickly solidified. In 1972 an estimated twenty
million Americans participated in Earth Day. More than 2000 colleges,
10,000 high schools and elementary schools, and 2000 communities took
part. Some twenty years later, the reverberations were still being felt as
millions of people celebrated the anniversary of Earth Day.'
Environmentalism has been remarkably durable. In 1989 eighty
percent of the population agreed that "[p]rotecting the environment is so
important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and con-
tinuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost."2
Other studies of public opinion characterize environmentalism as a "con-
sensual" value in American society.3
Indeed, environmentalist attitudes are now nearly omnipresent in
American society.4 With what must have been a certain sense of irony,
1. Robert Cahn & Patricia Cahn, Did Earth Day Change the World?, ENV'T, Sept. 1990,
at 16, 18-19, 37; see COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TWENTI-
ETH ANNUAL REPORT 4-5 (1990).
2. Roberto Suro, Grass-Roots Groups Show Power Battling Pollution Close to Home, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1989, at A18. It is doubtful that voters would really support environmental
regulation "regardless of cost," but their willingness to endorse this statement does show that
they place a high value on the environment. Cf. Richard L. Berke, Oratory of Environmental-
ism Becomes the Sound of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1990, at Al ("The environment ...
has reached the forefront of American politics, with candidates for one public office after an-
other proclaiming themselves environmentalists.").
3. See generally Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 4 (James Lester ed., 1989)
(describing evolution of public opinion over past three decades and impact on politics and
society).
4. See Mark Sagoff, Three Essays on Ethics and the Environment 1 (Dec. 10, 1990) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
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George Bush's head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
once offered a particularly vivid description of this situation:
"Increasingly, we are all environmentalists.... The President
is an environmentalist. Republicans and Democrats are envi-
ronmentalists. Jane Fonda and the National Association of
Manufacturers, Magic Johnson and Danny Devito, Candace
Bergen and The Golden Girls, Bugs Bunny and the cast of
Cheers are all environmentalists."'
Today, environmentalist attitudes are found in publications that cater to
a broad range of groups, from farm journals to car and truck magazines.'
Furthermore, environmentalism is surprisingly strong even in underde-
veloped countries. For example, 29% of those surveyed in Mexico vol-
unteered that environmental problems were among the most serious
facing that country, while 45% of Nigerians rated their country's envi-
ronmental problems as "very serious."7
At least for now, the goals of environmental law seem more deeply
entrenched than might have been expected in 1969. The more pressing
question today is the choice of means. One of the more obvious lessons
we have learned since 1969 is that aspirations do not automatically trans-
late into environmental improvements. How well have we succeeded in
achieving our environmental goals?
B. Evaluating the Current Regulatory System
Post-1969 environmental law has had some important successes.
Despite some disappointments, current regulatory schemes have pro-
duced genuine improvements in environmental quality. For instance, be-
tween 1970 and 1987, lead emissions declined 96% and sulfur dioxide
emissions dropped 28%.' Emissions of other air pollutants declined or
remained relatively constant despite substantial economic and population
growth. This record is especially impressive because the gross national
product increased by 72% and automobile use increased by about 50%-
in the same period.' Although these improvements might have been ob-
5. Id. (quoting Richard Darman, Keeping America First: American Romanticism and
the Global Economy, Address at the Second Annual Albert H. Gorden Lecture, Harvard
University (May 1, 1990)).
6. See Mark Sagoff, Settling America or the Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics, 12
J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349, 414-16 (1992).
7. Riley E. Dunlap et al., Of Global Concern: Results of the Health of the Planet Survey,
ENV'T, Nov. 1993, at 7, 9-10.
8. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 1, at 8.
9. Id. at 8-9.
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tained at lower cost, environmental statutes clearly have created impor-
tant public benefits. I"
Despite these accomplishments, the current regulatory system is far
from perfect. Critics convincingly point out two flaws in the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to mandate higher levels of
pollution control." First, imposing high levels of pollution control is
sometimes quite wasteful in terms of any corresponding environmental
benefit. For instance, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 197212 required two west coast paper mills to install expensive
pollution control equipment, the Pacific Ocean harmlessly diluted the
pollution. 3 It took a special act of Congress to rectify the situation. 14
Second, this method of pollution control is inherently cumbersome.
The EPA must learn the pollution control technologies and economic
conditions in each industry to determine the best available technology.
A major EPA rule may require tens of thousands of pages of documenta-
tion, including careful responses to dozens of arguments raised by the
industry. 5 Even with all this effort, the EPA cannot fully master the
economics and technologies of dozens of industries, from petrochemicals
to steel to electric utilities. It is bound to make mistakes in both direc-
tions: asking more than some industries can reasonably achieve and let-
ting others off too lightly. 6 Because the regulatory process is so
10. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). Even in Los Angeles air quality has substantially improved.
See James M. Lents & William J. Kelly, Clearing the Air in Los Angeles, Sci. AM., Oct. 1993,
at 32.
11. Unfortunately, the current regulatory system is not easy to explain because the federal
pollution statutes have grown to be almost as complicated as the Internal Revenue Code. Basi-
cally, the Clean Water Act requires polluters to use the highest feasible degree of pollution
control. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). The Clean Air Act has
similarly explicit requirements for new pollution sources, but a different set of legal rules aimed
primarily at existing polluters. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
In practice, however, existing polluters are often also held to a feasibility standard.
12. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.A.).
13. See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1053 (1981). The lack of harmful effects of these discharges does not seem to have been in
serious dispute.
14. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
15. The courts have done a great deal to make this process even more cumbersome than
necessary. See infra part II.B.
16. The crux of these criticisms is that the EPA has the desire to regulate but not enough
information, while industry has all the information but little incentive to use it. If regulations
were tailored to each individual plant, society could receive equally clean air and water but
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cumbersome, these mistakes are difficult to correct when they are later
discovered.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)17 is the most notable deviation from
this regulatory model. Rather than relying upon extensive EPA regula-
tions to clean up existing hazardous waste sites, CERCLA attempts to
use civil liability as its main instrument for environmental protection.
Unfortunately, the nearly universal consensus is that this experiment has
been unsuccessful. As Peter Menell reports,
The extraordinary social cost of this litigation can be
pieced together from a variety of sources. EPA spends approxi-
mately 12 percent of Superfund monies on enforcement, which
includes litigation costs, data collection and review, and report
preparation. [One study] estimates the total (private and gov-
ernmental) transaction costs of CERCLA liability to be be-
tween 24 and 44 percent of the direct costs of clean-up. The
Office of Technology Assessment (1985) estimates that the Na-
tional Priority List could reach 10,000 sites, costing in excess of
$100 billion to remedy. With rapidly escalating remediation
costs, in part attributable to stricter clean-up standards enacted
in 1986, the transaction costs of CERCLA's clean-up effort
could exceed $44 billion.'"
Despite these large transaction costs, relatively little actual "cleaning up"
seems to have taken place. 9
As disappointing as CERCLA has been in achieving its goals, it has
an even more fundamental flaw. The scientific premise of the statute was
that hazardous waste, and toxic chemicals more generally, present an
urgent public health risk. As we will see in the next section, however,
scientific evidence has rapidly evolved, leaving environmental policy
struggling to keep up.
perhaps at a much lower price. Society could then spend some of the savings on an even
higher level of pollution control, benefitting industry while upgrading the environment.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
18. Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 108 (1991) (citation omitted).
19. According to recent reports, fewer than 70 of the 1275 sites on the National Priorities
List have been cleaned up. Rudy Abramson, The Superfund Cleanup: Mired in Its Own Mess,
L.A. TiMEs, May 10, 1993, at Al.
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C. Scientific Uncertainty
In the early 1970s toxic chemicals were thought to be a major can-
cer threat. Consequently, leaking hazardous waste sites were considered
a clear and present danger to the public health. Rigorous regulation fol-
lowed in the form of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA),2 ° which was primarily aimed at future waste disposal,
with CERCLA providing stringent clean-up requirements for existing
waste sites. By the time these statutes were in place, however, their sci-
entific basis was already eroding.21
Dioxin exemplifies the changing scientific view of carcinogens. At
one point dioxin was considered the most deadly carcinogen in existence,
even in microscopic doses. It still retains that reputation with the public,
but scientific opinion has moved in the opposite direction. By 1991,
based on evidence that dioxin can only cause harm after binding to cer-
tain cellular receptors, scientists argued that it might well be noncarci-
nogenic below certain exposures. 22 Recent empirical data also raise
questions about the dangers of dioxin. A factory explosion in 1976 ex-
posed 37,000 people to high levels of dioxin. A recent epidemiological
study revealed worrisome increases in some cancers, but the overall can-
cer rate was actually lower than the rate among the general population.23
Although dioxin and other toxic chemicals seem to be less danger-
ous than once believed, scientific knowledge is equally capable of con-
firming rather than undermining the argument for preventive measures.
When international negotiations began in 1986, it was quite unclear
whether the ozone layer was actually in any danger. Although more
convincing evidence relating to the Antarctic ozone "hole" began to ap-
pear during the negotiations, it was only later that a scientific consensus
20. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993)).
21. See Brian E. Henderson et al., Toward the Primary Prevention of Cancer, 254 Scl.
1131, 1137 (1991).
22. Leslie Roberts, Dioxin Risks Revisited, 251 Sci. 624 (1991).
23. Keith Schneider, 2 Decades After Toxic Blast in Italy, Several Cancers Show Rise, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1993, at B6. The EPA now seems to be planning to reaffirm the dangers of
dioxin. Interestingly, the primary danger seems to be from airborne dioxin (which contami-
nates food supplies), not from hazardous waste sites. EPA Dioxin Draft to Affirm Cancer
Risks, Highlight Non-Cancer Effects, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Jan. 14, 1994, at 1-2. There is
some reason to believe that dioxin actually inhibits the development of certain cancers, render-
ing the situation all the more confusing.
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emerged.24 Even today, however, there are major uncertainties about the
causal mechanisms and effects of ozone depletion.2"
Similar uncertainties exist regarding other major environmental is-
sues. For example, after a careful review of the evidence regarding the
greenhouse effect, Christopher Stone found the data much less clear than
he expected:
[H]aving recited in a draft the popular menace that the polar
ice caps were ready to melt on us and so on, I waited for the
authoritative backing to materialize in memos [from Stone's re-
search assistant]. I waited in vain. The deeper into the better
authorities we fished, the vaguer and more qualified the projec-
tions we landed.... Over the space of the few years that I have
been following the research developments, all of the original,
highly publicized projections of climate change variables have
without exception crept back to much more modest levels than
in the original scare stories.26
Similarly, despite well-founded concerns about the danger to biodivers-
ity, we are just beginning to obtain basic data such as how much of the
Amazon forest we are losing.27
It is tempting to think that we understand environmental risks and
need only to find appropriate solutions. The reality is that we are faced
with a high degree of uncertainty. But that uncertainty is not static-
scientists are constantly improving our information base. These realities
must help shape any intelligent strategy of environmental protection.
D. What Have We Learned?
Looking back over the last twenty-five years of environmental law,
one cannot help but be struck by how much we have learned. We have
discovered that regulatory efforts that seemed plausible when enacted
can often prove disappointing in practice. We have found that the scien-
24. See RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 17-18 (1991).
25. Gary Taubes, The Ozone Backlash, 260 ScI. 1580, 1583 (1993). For a report on the
current status of ozone research, see Jose M. Rodriguez, Probing Stratospheric Ozone, 261 SCI.
1128 (1993).
26. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT AND HUMAN AGENDA at xvi-xvii (1993). For Stone's review of the evidence, see id. at
13-16, 20-25. Stone goes on to conclude, correctly in my view,"that despite substantial uncer-
tainties the possibility of global climate change should be taken very seriously. See id. at 26-
32. It should be noted that long-term predictions (over a 200-500 year period) remain quite
gloomy. See Richard A. Kerr, No Way to Cool the Ultimate Greenhouse, 262 ScI. 648 (1993).
27. See David Skole & Compton Tucker, Tropical Deforestation and Habitat Fragmenta-
tion in the Amazon: Satellite Data from 1978 to 1988, 260 Scl. 1905 (1993).
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tific basis for environmental protection can shift quickly. Indeed, we
have learned that our environmental agenda itself is subject to constant
revision; we learn that some problems are under control or are less seri-
ous than we thought, while at the same time we discover previously un-
forseen environmental problems.
Strangely enough, however, we do not seem to have adapted to the
reality of this constant change. Subconsciously, we seem to assume that,
whereas much of what we believed five or ten years ago is outmoded, we
are now finally in a good position to make permanent decisions about the
environment. Thus, we still seem to conceptualize environmental protec-
tion in static terms: Given the information now available, what is the
best solution to a given environmental problem?
When information changes slowly, this may be the best way to think
about public policy. But when the information base is itself subject to
rapid change, a more dynamic approach is needed. It makes little sense
to agonize over today's decision when it is likely to require revision to-
morrow anyway. Moreover, given the inadequacy of our current infor-
mation, developing new information is a critical need. Finally, because
of inadequate information, predictions about a decision's effects have
only limited value. Instead, we need to focus on experimentation, trying
many different things and attempting to learn from the results.
In a nutshell, one of the main lessons we should learn from the last
twenty-five years is the centrality of learning to the enterprise of environ-
mental protection. The remainder of this Essay attempts to work out
some of the implications of that lesson.
II. TOWARD EFFICIENT METHODS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEARNING
There are two different strategies for improving environmental
learning. One is decentralization-moving decision making from large
federal bureaucracies to the private sector or to smaller units of govern-
ment. The other is to streamline the federal regulatory process-trying
to perform the proverbial organizational task of "teaching the elephant
to dance." I will consider these strategies in turn.
A. Decentralizing Decision Making
Large hierarchies are not famous for their ability to respond quickly
and effectively to change.28 In order to sensibly allocate pollution restric-
tions, it is necessary to learn a great deal about the technological and
28. In the private sector one need only consider the difficulties encountered by even a
"model" corporation such as IBM in a period of extremely rapid change.
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economic circumstances of polluters. Because these conditions are sub-
ject to rapid change, and because of the inherent delays of centralized
decision making, the EPA may be unable to keep up with these changes.
By decentralizing environmental decision making, subject to appropriate
controls, we may be able to improve the responsiveness of environmental
protection to changing circumstances and new information.
Markets are one form of decentralization. In theory, markets can be
extraordinarily swift and efficient ways of integrating the information
available to individual firms. Can these strengths of market institutions
serve the environment?
The standard arguments for incentive schemes focus on their static
efficiency. If economists are right, these schemes should do a good job of
allocating responsibility for pollution control among various polluters at
any given time. For present purposes, however, dynamic efficiency may
be even more important. Markets can be remarkably adept at respond-
ing quickly to new information. Consider, for example, the recent deci-
sion by a brokerage firm to purchase a supercomputer in order to shave
two seconds off the firm's response time for shifts in the Tokyo stock
market.29 Although this example certainly cannot be considered typical,
it does highlight how markets can force firms to learn quickly from new
information. Thus, one method to expedite learning is to organize a
market.
Economists have designed ingenious incentive systems to create
markets for environmental protection. Some promising efforts have been
made at implementation, the most ambitious being the new system of
marketable sulfur dioxide allowances under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990.30 We cannot be sure that the theoretical arguments for
incentive schemes will apply equally to their actual implementation.
Nevertheless, they are certainly worth a serious try.3'
29. Survey: Frontiers of Finance, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 60, survey at 4.
30. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
31. Although these incentive systems are promising, we should not be overly confident
about translating that theory into practice. Real-world implementation of regulatory reform
may raise significant practical problems and conflict with other goals like equity. For argu-
ments in favor of technology-based standards on these grounds, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Imagin-
ing the Future; Remembering the Past, 1991 DUKE L.J. 711, 721-23; Joel A. Mintz, Economic
Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 149 (1991); and Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical. The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729. Moreover, the actual legal
enactments are likely to differ considerably from the elegant theoretical models, if only for
political reasons. Compare the intellectual elegance of the concept of an income tax with the
notorious complexity of the Internal Revenue Code!
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Federalism provides another possible form of decentralization.
Under our current approach to regulation, most important standards are
set in Washington. One result is that regulations tend to be insensitive to
differences in technological and economic constraints and to variations in
environmental problems. It is difficult for the EPA to learn enough
about these differences. The problem might be reduced by shifting more
front-line regulatory authority to the states, subject to streamlined fed-
eral supervision.
The Clean Water Act is a good illustration. The current regulatory
scheme gives the EPA control over pollution standards, with limited dis-
cretion for state regulators. Under an alternate approach once favored
by industry, the EPA would have established ranges of effluent limits for
various industrial categories, as well as a list of factors to be used in
making choices within that range. The states would then have chosen
limits for individual plants within that range, subject to the EPA's veto.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach largely for statutory reasons,
but was also concerned about the impracticality of requiring the EPA to
review thousands of state-issued permits.32 Today, however, "[w]e can
generate, analyze, and communicate a thousand times more information
than we could just a generation ago, for a fraction of the cost." 3 Given
modem methods of statistical quality control, the EPA could provide
effective oversight for an individualized permit issuance system.34
This approach would have several advantages over the current regu-
latory scheme. It would reduce the costs of "one size fits all" regulation
by allowing closer tailoring of effluent limits to the needs of individual
32. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1977). Despite the
limits of the state role under the current regulatory scheme, some successful state innovation in
water pollution control has taken place. See WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FED-
ERALISM: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 73-78 (1992).
33. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE EN-
TREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 141 (1992).
34. Efficient systems to oversee even 42,000 permits (the number given by the du Pont
Court, see 430 U.S. at 132-33) do not seem out of the question. Consider, for example, the
vastly greater number of Medicare claims or income tax returns that must be screened annu-
ally. For example, the EPA might create a model to predict effluent limitations for plants
having particular characteristics; the model could be based on economic or engineering theory,
or it could incorporate statistical studies of actual permits from other states. Permits straying
too far from the prediction would be automatically audited, as would a random sample of
other permits. For an insightful analysis of a similar proposal for the use of statistical claim
profiles in tort cases, see Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481 (1992). As an incentive, there could be a monetary penalty for
rejected permits (with arbitration of any disputed claims). No doubt, an expert on quality
control could devise a much better system, but even this rough sketch suggests that a solution
is feasible.
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plants. Also, because the EPA guidelines would be more flexible than
the current regulations, they could justifiably be less precise and less
heavily documented. This could help streamline the rule-making process
and might encourage judges to ease the intrusiveness of judicial review.
Finally, the permit limitations established by different states could pro-
vide valuable new information, so that the EPA could adjust the guide-
lines based on experience.
3
Under this approach delegation to the states would be used to in-
crease the responsiveness of regulation to local conditions. Increased del-
egation could also be used to help learn about possible new regulatory
methods. The Brandeisian ideal of states as laboratories takes on a new
relevance today. One of the things we have learned about environmental
regulation is that good ideas do not always work out in practice. No
matter how much we try to improve the regulatory process, many of our
best ideas will fail while less promising ideas sometimes will be unexpect-
edly successful. Or, more bluntly, we are always going to make a lot of
mistakes. Given this reality, we ought to run a lot of experiments to test
regulatory proposals.
There are obvious risks in delegating too much authority to states
that may lack the resources, expertise, or political will to implement in-
novative environmental programs. But these risks are not insurmounta-
ble. Subject to some safeguards, we could give the EPA broad authority
to contract with selected states to create innovative programs. 36 The re-
sult would be to encourage the states to innovate to find better ways of
meeting environmental goals. Successful state programs could then oper-
ate as models for other states or be incorporated into federal law. Unsuc-
cessful state programs are nearly as important, since observing them may
save us from making costly errors on a national scale.
B. Making Regulatory Agencies More Dynamic
No matter how much we try to decentralize, federal agencies like
the EPA are still going to be making important regulatory decisions.
35. For example, if a state with generally stringent standards is found to be issuing permits
with low requirements for a category of sources, the EPA might want to consider whether its
initial technological expectations were too high. On the other hand, the issuance of unexpect-
edly strict permits by some states might trigger a reappraisal in the opposite direction.
36. These contracts would only be available to states that had demonstrated the capacity
to run an effective regulatory program. The contract would contain quantitative performance
measures: specific levels of air or water quality to be met by particular dates. Failure to
achieve these standards would result in financial penalties against the state or in cancellation of
the contract. Finally, minimum federal standards would remain in place as a safeguard against
risks to public health or irreparable environmental damage.
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Our current regulatory paradigm focuses on maximizing the quality of
each individual agency decision. Except in a static situation, however,
this may not optimize regulatory outcomes over time. We need to move
agencies toward a more dynamic mode, in which regulation is viewed as
an ongoing cycle of experimentation and evaluation.
It seems rather painfully obvious that we cannot expect to improve
environmental quality if we do not even know the current state of the
environment. Unfortunately, our pollution monitoring is strikingly inad-
equate.37 With regard to toxics, the EPA's information base was so weak
that it was shocked by the huge discharges revealed when companies
made the disclosures mandated by the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act of 1986.38 We urgently need better informa-
tion about the present condition of the environment. Otherwise, we will
never be capable of monitoring the effectiveness of our current efforts,
which is a necessary prerequisite of learning to do better.
We also need much better follow up on specific regulatory mecha-
nisms. For example, as we have seen, incentive schemes present exciting
possibilities for making environmental protection more cost effective.
But we badly need to know how well the schemes work in practice. Un-
fortunately, as two leading environmental economists observe, "In spite
of the potential importance of emissions trading as an alternative to con-
ventional regulatory approaches, surprisingly little effort has been spent
evaluating the impact of this program."39 Extensive follow-up studies on
existing programs should be a high priority. It makes little sense to con-
tinue pouring resources into programs with so little effort to evaluate
their effectiveness.
In an ideal world the desirability of improved information would
immediately translate into a higher EPA budget for research and data
collection. Given the federal deficit, this is an unlikely prospect; indeed,
the EPA has been struggling to return its research budget to pre-Reagan
levels." Some funds can be reallocated from other EPA activities, but
this too has its limits. Consequently, we need to find ways to enlist in-
37. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 793, 866 (1992). For a survey of environmental monitoring and calls for im-
provement, see COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TWENTY-SEC-
OND ANNUAL REPORT 43-56 (1992).
38. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991)); see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 37, at 624.
39. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of
EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109 (1989).
40. See Robin Shifrin, Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE
L.J. 547, 563 n.72 (1992).
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dustry in this process. Existing law contains several mechanisms relating
to information generation. Pollution permits often require monitoring
and reporting of data, and these requirements can be expanded. Indeed,
there is precedent for requiring regulated parties to finance research.41
Despite some implementation problems, statutes such as the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA)4' and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)43 also provide a basis for more creative
data generation requirements in the private sector.' Once information is
obtained, we also need better systems for accessing the data bases.45
The possibility of acquiring relevant new information can also sig-
nificantly change standards for decision making. What economists call
"hysteresis effects" can dramatically modify the results of a conventional
cost-benefit analysis.46 Although the mathematical analysis is complex,
the basic idea is not difficult to understand. If a decision has irreparable
consequences, then it may be worth delaying the decision in order to
obtain new information. Taking an irreversible step forecloses the possi-
bility of future learning, and therefore incurs an extra cost that does not
show up in the usual cost-benefit analysis.47 In a formal sense waiting is
equivalent to purchasing an option contract, and under many circum-
stances that option has positive value. Under some circumstances taking
this option value into account can change the standards for decision
making. It is not unusual to find that an irreversible project should not
41. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 935 (1976) (upholding EPA requirement that firm undertake research program to im-
prove pollution control technology).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
44. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk- Information, Regulatory Pol-
icy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 318-32 (1991).
45. See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws
to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1840-55 (1989). Environmental impact
statements could also provide another major source of environmental data, if they were prop-
erly integrated into a database.
46. See Avinash Dixit, Investment and Hysteresis, 6 J. EcON. PERSP. 107 (1992). The
basic point is that "[w]here there is uncertainty, there may be learning." W. Kip Viscusi &
Richard Zeckhauser, Environmental Policy Choice Under Uncertainty, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 97, 108 (1976).
47. For example, suppose that a project now has a 40% chance of producing a $1 million
loss, and a 60% chance of netting a $1 million gain. This looks like a good investment, since
the expected profit is $200,000. On the other hand, suppose that by waiting six weeks, we can
know the outcome of the investment with certainty. We will then invest in the project 60% of
the time, for an expected gain of $600,000, with no losses (since we will know not to invest in
the loss situation). Hence, the value of waiting is $600,000 minus $200,000, or $400,000. Even
if we factor in the time value of money, waiting looks like the wise decision, because making an
immediate decision deprives us of the opportunity to obtain further information at a time when
it can still do us some good.
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be undertaken unless its expected benefits are twice as much as its cost.4 8
Otherwise, it is often better to wait for more information.
Given the magnitude of uncertainty and the likelihood of obtaining
more information, hysteresis effects may be quite important in environ-
mental law. Often, these effects push the balance toward environmental
regulation. Destroying a rain forest or an endangered species is irrevers-
ible. Usually, whatever benefits can be obtained from the action will be
available if we wait, while the uncertainty about costs will be reduced.
Hence, there is a good argument for waiting while attempting to learn
more.
On the other hand, hysteresis effects may disfavor certain forms of
pollution control. Large capital expenditures for pollution control are
likely to be unrecoverable if it turns out that better technologies become
available, or that the harm caused by the pollution has been overesti-
mated. Simply waiting for more information may be unacceptable, but it
may be worth considering less capital-intensive methods of control. Ex-
amples that come to mind include the use of respirators by workers to
deal with airborne occupational hazards, or the use of low-sulfur coal
rather than scrubbers to deal with acid rain. These alternatives may not
be the best solutions, but they can buy time while we seek more
information.
Rather than taking advantage of the possibility of dynamic learning,
an agency may invest its resources in making each individual regulatory
decision as nearly perfect as possible. It may seem obvious that an im-
proved decision is always worthwhile. In a world of limited staff and
budget, however, improvements in quality come at the expense of delay
and reduced output. Moreover, by the time all the data has been sifted
through and all the analytical bases have been covered, the world may
have changed.49 The agency may find that the scientific data or techno-
logical and economic constraints have shifted, leaving it with the choice
48. See Dixit, supra note 46, at 116. See id. at 117, 120 for other examples of the magni-
tude of hysteresis effects. Sometimes, we may be uncertain about the degree of irreversibility
itself, and here too the possibility of learning must be taken into account. See Viscusi &
Zeckhauser, supra note 46, at 107-08.
49. Consider Lee Iacocca's remarks to an executive who helped delay the adoption of
front-wheel drive vehicles by Ford:
"The trouble with you, Phil, [he said], is that you went to Harvard, where they told
you not to take any action until you've got all of the facts. You've got ninety-five
percent of them, but it's going to take you another six months to get that last five
percent. And by the time you do, your facts will be out of date because the market
has moved on you."
DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 516 (1986) (quoting Lee Iacocca).
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of either starting over or closing the record and adopting a potentially
obsolete regulation.5"
Agencies have been pushed toward static decision making by "hard
look" judicial review, under which courts closely scrutinize the adminis-
trative record to ensure agency rationality. Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst have detailed how the federal automobile safety program was
brought to a standstill by judicial obsession with obtaining a full rec-
ord." It is not difficult to find cases in which the EPA's technical deci-
sions have been overturned by courts demanding further documentation
and more careful analysis. 2 Despite the initial appeal of hard look re-
view, there is substantial support for Thomas McGarity's recent
appraisal:
The predictable result of stringent "hard look" judicial re-
view of complex rulemaking is ossification. Because the agen-
cies perceive that the reviewing courts are inconsistent in the
degree to which they are deferential, they are constrained to
prepare for the worst-case scenario on judicial review. This can
be extremely resource-intensive and time-consuming. More-
over, since the criteria for substantive judicial review are the
same for repealing old rules as for promulgating new rules, the
50. Agencies may be trapped in a vicious circle. Because decision making is so cumber-
some, it is costly to reconsider existing regulations. Knowing that revisions will be difficult,
the agency puts even more stress on perfecting each regulatory decision. This in turn raises the
cost of issuing regulations, and the cycle continues. One way of escaping the cycle might be to
adopt formulas or regulatory methodologies rather than specific numerical standards, so that
some adjustments could be made automatically. The analogy is to the use of cost-of-living
adjustment standards to adjust for inflation.
51. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY (1990).
52. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (overturning
EPA's carefully considered asbestos regulations, effectively wrecking its most serious effort to
implement Toxic Substances Control Act). It is not unfair to say that the Fifth Circuit's
opinion
is so lacking in deference to the agency's exercise of expertise and policy judgment,
and so full of attempts to impose on the agency the judges' own views of the proper
role of regulation in society, that it is virtually indistinguishable from the documents
that OMB prepares in connection with its oversight of EPA rulemaking.
Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1423 (1992).
Other judges have not hesitated to correct agencies on technical issues such as choice of
the proper computer model. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992)
(demanding that agency separately document health effects for each of 428 toxic substances,
although OSHA argued this was scientifically infeasible); Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th
Cir.), afl'd, 798 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting EPA computer model); Gulf S. Insulation
v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983) (second guessing agency's
decision on technical issues).
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agencies are equally chary of revisiting old rules, even in the
name of flexibility. 3
It is tempting to suggest abandoning the hard look doctrine. The
proper level of judicial review is, however, a complex question. Hard
look review has been used for various purposes, ranging from the effort
to keep the agency from ignoring its statutory mandate, to efforts to im-
prove the technical quality of agency decisions. Moreover, the proper
scope of review is an issue that may arise in different settings, involving
different agencies, statutes, and policy concerns. Despite its drawbacks,
hard look review may sometimes be justified in at least some of these
settings.
Rather than seeking a global change in the level of judicial scrutiny,
we might do better to vary the level of review depending on whether the
agency is taking a dynamic or static approach to regulation. A sensible
approach would be to lower the scope of review when an agency plans to
monitor a rule's implementation and make appropriate modifications. In
light of the previous discussion, we might lower the level of review when
the agency can demonstrate that (1) its action will not cause irreparable
injury; (2) it has taken steps to generate additional relevant information;
and (3) it has a process in place that will in fact result in a reappraisal of
current policy as the new information is developed. When these factors
are present, a more deferential form of judicial scrutiny is wise, and in-
deed, provides an incentive for agencies to shift toward dynamic
regulation.
III. CONCLUSION
This Essay considers how environmental protection can function
more effectively, given the high degree of uncertainty and our rapidly
evolving understanding of environmental problems. The solutions in-
clude decentralization-more use of markets and federalism-as well as
making learning strategies more central to environmental regulation.
Such improvements are only worth considering, however, if there is some
prospect of regulatory reform-a possibility that some might consider
remote. Nevertheless, there are grounds for hope that improvements can
actually be implemented.
It would be naive to assume that once they are identified, better
methods of environmental protection will automatically be adopted. Pol-
iticians and bureaucrats have incentives that do not always correspond to
the public interest. We cannot simply ignore the problem of incentive
53. McGarity, supra note 52, at 1419-20 (citations omitted).
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design; indeed, as lawyers, it should be one of our continuing focuses.
Nevertheless, at least in the environmental area, mechanisms seem to
have evolved for at least roughly translating the public's values into oper-
ational form.54 It seems reasonably likely that if improved methods of
environmental protection can be identified, political strategies can be
found for implementing them.
54. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 59 (1992).
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